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Security Audit
September 12, 2025
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Fleek's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team on September 10, 2025.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Fleek Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
| Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Fleek was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The protocol ERC20 token that incorporates OpenZeppelin's Permit, Burnable, and ERC1363 extensions. The total supply is fixed at 100_000_000 tokens, which are minted during deployment to the recipient address specified in the constructor.
Considered untrusted and acting in their own self-interest. The system is designed to be defensive against users attempting to withdraw stakes or claim rewards outside of the rules.
lockPeriod. The system verifies that block.timestamp is greater than or equal to stakeTimestamp + lockPeriod before allowing a withdrawal.balanceOf) and the time it has been staked relative to the global rewardPerToken value._totalSupply (which affects the rewardRate for all), they cannot directly alter the balances or earned rewards of other users.DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)Highly trusted. The Admin is a privileged role, intended to be a Foundation Multisig, with significant administrative control over the operational state of the StakingRewards contract. This entity is trusted to:
stake() function in emergencies or deprecation.REWARDS_DISTRIBUTOR role.rewardsDuration parameter.AccessControlDefaultAdminRules, which prevents immediate takeovers.recoverERC20 function responsibly.REWARDS_DISTRIBUTOR)Trusted, specialized role. This actor is responsible for the liveness and solvency of the rewards program. The entire incentive mechanism depends on its reliable operation. This entity is trusted to:
notifyRewardAmount() to ensure there are no gaps in reward distribution.StakingRewards contract before calling notifyRewardAmount() to meet the contract's internal balance verification.The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
Specifically, we audited the following contracts within this repository:
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| ./src/staking/StakingRewards.sol |
|
| ./src/token/FLKToken.sol |
|
Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
|
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
|
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
|
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
|
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
|
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
|
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
totalSupply is zero
In the StakingRewards contract, the REWARDS_DISTRIBUTOR is entrusted to provide tokens and initiate the reward accrual through the notifyRewardAmount() function. This function sets the rewardRate, lastUpdateTime, and periodFinish to start accruing rewards per token per second.
function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 reward)
external
onlyRole(REWARDS_DISTRIBUTOR)
updateReward(address(0))
{
if (block.timestamp >= periodFinish) {
rewardRate = reward / rewardsDuration;
} else {
uint256 remaining = periodFinish - block.timestamp;
uint256 leftover = remaining * rewardRate;
rewardRate = (reward + leftover) / rewardsDuration;
}
// Ensure the provided reward amount is not more than the balance in the contract.
// This keeps the reward rate in the right range, preventing overflows due to
// very high values of rewardRate in the earned and rewardsPerToken functions;
// Reward + leftover must be less than 2^256 / 10^18 to avoid overflow.
uint256 balance = rewardsToken.balanceOf(address(this));
require(rewardRate <= balance / rewardsDuration, RewardTooHigh());
lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
periodFinish = block.timestamp + rewardsDuration;
emit RewardAdded({ reward: reward });
}
Reference: StakingRewards.sol#L251-274
However, if the total deposits are zero before calling notifyRewardAmount() or drop to zero between reward cycles, the rewards that accrue during this zero-deposit period will not be distributed when new stakes are made; these rewards will remain undistributed.
It's worth noting that users have no incentives to withdraw stakes during an active reward cycle. Additionally, any unscheduled rewards can be redistributed in a new reward cycle by including them in the reward parameter when calling notifyRewardAmount().
Remediations to Consider:
notifyRewardAmount when no supply exists, and begin distributing these accrued rewards upon the first stake. This only mitigates the initial reward distribution cycle with zero supply.Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Fleek team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.