Need an audit or want to learn more about Macro’s services?
Reach out for an audit or to learn more about Macro
Security Audit
October 17, 2024
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Infinex's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from October 14th to October 15th, 2024.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Infinex Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
| Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Code Quality | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| Gas Optimization | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Infinex was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
b012e54c8c10e88eef5c825b36c1ecfd1385c9b0
c279c612e963e84f7cb1d77f6502f4cbc9474b1e
Specifically, we audited the following contracts within this repository:
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/patron/IPatronVesting.sol |
|
| src/patron/PatronVesting.sol |
|
| src/patron/PatronVestingStorage.sol |
|
Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
claimWithERC1271() function or the claimWithERC1271ToAllowlistedAddress() function can be called multiple times
_startTime input in setTierStartTime() function
_tierId is valid in setTierStartTime() function
addTrustedForwarder() and removeTrustedForwarder() functions
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
|
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
|
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
|
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
|
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
|
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
|
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
The PatronVesting contract allows claiming reward tokens to an Infinex account with the account’s sudo signature, using either the claimWithERC1271() function or the claimWithERC1271ToAllowlistedAddress() function with an EIP1271 signature. In the claimWithERC1271() function, the hash structure is the combination of _tierId with uint8 type, _recipient with address type, and _amount with uint256 type:
bytes32 requestHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_tierId, _recipient, _amount));
Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L239
In claimWithERC1271ToAllowlistedAddress() function, the hash structure is the combination of _tierId with uint8 type, _recipient with address type, _destination with address type, and _amount with uint256 type:
bytes32 requestHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_tierId, _recipient, _destination, _amount));
Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L263
The hash structures of these 2 functions are relatively simple. In the future, when more contracts allow the EIP1271 standard for Infinex accounts, it could lead to a single signature being a valid input for different functions from different contracts, potentially leading to unpredictable behavior.
Remediations to Consider
Consider including the PatronVesting address and corresponding function selector in the hashing structure of the signature
claimWithERC1271() function or the claimWithERC1271ToAllowlistedAddress() function can be called multiple times
The PatronVesting contract allows claiming NFTs to an Infinex account with the account’s sudo signature, using either the claimWithERC1271() function or the claimWithERC1271ToAllowlistedAddress() function with an EIP1271 signature. These functions don’t have any mechanism to prevent the same signature from being reused. Even though the NFTs will be sent to the correct account, it is still a potential griefing vector and we recommend preventing signatures from being replay.
Remediations to Consider
Consider including a nonce mechanism in the hashing structure of the signature
_startTime input in setTierStartTime() function
In the PatronVesting.setTierStartTime() function, the _startTime input lacks validation to check whether the value is too small. If an unintentionally small value is provided by the contract owner, the NFT can be claimed immediately.
Remediation to Consider
Consider adding a lower bound value to the setTierStartTime() function
- if (_startTime == 0 || _startTime < PatronVestingStorage._deploymentTime())
+ if (_startTime < PatronVestingStorage._deploymentTime())
_tierId is valid in setTierStartTime() function
In the PatronVesting.setTierStartTime() function, the _tierId input is not checked to verify if the tier already exists. This allows the owner to set startDate without adding the actual tier. As a result, a new tier is created with unchangeable zero values for lockupDuration, releaseDuration, tierType, and tierOwner. Furthermore, if vesting entries would be added to this new tier, recipients could claim them immediately.
Remediation to Consider
Consider disallowing non-existent tiers when calling the setTierStartTime() function.
addTrustedForwarder() and removeTrustedForwarder() functions
The PatronVesting contract can only add a trusted forwarder via the initialize() function, which is not expected. Consider overriding addTrustedForwarder() and removeTrustedForwarder() functions from ERC2771BaseUpgradeable contract.
In the addVestingEntry() function, the VestingEntryAdded event doesn’t need to include _ERC2771MsgSender, as it will always be the distributor contract.
The onlyDistributor modifier can use msg.sender directly instead of _ERC2771MsgSender(), since it is only used by the distributor contract.
The onlyDistributor modifier passes a parameter _tierId, which is not used.
PatronVesting uses nonces to track claimed NFTs. Those nonces are stored in a mapping(uint256 => bool) which uses an entire storage slot per nonce used. Instead, if a bitmap would be used, a single storage slot can hold up to 256 nonces, significantly reducing the gas costs (3k gas instead of 20k) after the first one written to the slot.
Remediation to Consider
Consider using a bitmap to track used nonces. A good reference implementation can be found here.
Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Infinex team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.