Security Audit
December 20, 2024
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Infinex's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team on November 4th, November 29th, 2024, and from December 17th to 19th, 2024.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Infinex Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
---|---|---|---|---|
Low | 1 | - | 1 | - |
Code Quality | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Gas Optimization | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Infinex was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
00a8bd9df742deeebc4000fdf7f9f3eb21929657
186a5898d243ac7558f3f2524890daca0ebd39b3
a6e8af197c10db763c0f4530856606a71f08ba3b
3205d8da2bc29688f905b64d446facaf0eb33b54
Specifically, we audited the following contracts for
Patron Vesting V2 within commit 186a5898d243ac7558f3f2524890daca0ebd39b3
:
Source Code | SHA256 |
---|---|
src/patron/IPatronVesting.sol |
|
src/patron/PatronVesting.sol |
|
src/patron/PatronVestingStorage.sol |
|
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
Severity | Description |
---|---|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
tierOwnerAddVestingEntry()
fails when using trusted forwarder
When calling the PatronNFT.tierOwnerAddVestingEntry()
function, the tier owner can either call the function directly or via the trusted forwarder:
modifier onlyTierOwner(uint8 _tierId) {
if (_ERC2771MsgSender() != PatronVestingStorage._tierConfig(_tierId).tierOwner) {
revert UnauthorizedCaller();
}
_;
}
Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L81-L86
When using the trusted forwarder, the patron NFTs are pulled from msg.sender
, which will be the forwarder address instead of the tier owner as expected. As a result, the function reverts:
function tierOwnerAddVestingEntry(address _recipient, uint256[] calldata _indices, uint8 _tierId)
external
onlyTierOwner(_tierId)
{
emit VestingEntryAdded(_recipient, _tierId);
IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
>> patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _indices);
PatronVestingStorage._addVestingEntry(_recipient, _tierId, _indices);
}
Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L251-L259
Remediations to Consider:
Consider replacing msg.sender
with _ERC2771MsgSender()
:
function tierOwnerAddVestingEntry(address _recipient, uint256[] calldata _indices, uint8 _tierId)
external
onlyTierOwner(_tierId)
{
emit VestingEntryAdded(_recipient, _tierId);
IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
- patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _indices);
+ patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(_ERC2771MsgSender(), address(this), _indices);
PatronVestingStorage._addVestingEntry(_recipient, _tierId, _indices);
}
We are highly unlikely to use with the forwarder as all the tier owners are safe's / EOA's and we are likely to submit transactions via script or the cannon website
address(0)
check for _newRecipient
In allocateCWGTokens
, there is no check that prevents passing address(0)
for the _newRecipient
parameter. This is in contrast to PatronDistributor’s registerRecipient
function, which explicitly doesn’t allow providing address(0)
for the _recipient
parameter.
Remediation to Consider
Revert if address(0)
is passed for the _newRecipient
parameter.
The _end
and _start
validation checks in _getVestingEntryRange()
can never occur when being called from _claim()
. They can be abstracted to the getVestingEntryRange()
view function.
function _getVestingEntryRange(address _recipient, uint8 _tierId, uint256 _start, uint256 _end)
internal
view
returns (uint256[] memory tokenIds)
{
Data storage store = getStorage();
- if (_end <= _start || _end > store.vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId].totalAllocation) {
- revert IPatronVesting.InvalidRange();
- }
uint256 length = _end - _start;
tokenIds = new uint256[](length);
// Only loads the specific array elements needed
unchecked {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length;) {
tokenIds[i] = store.vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId].tokenIds[_start + i];
++i;
}
}
}
Reference: PatronVestingStorage.sol#L116-L132
claimable
calculation can also be included in the unchecked
block as the releasedAmount
will always be higher or equal to the claimedAmount
.
- uint256 claimable = releasedAmount - claimedAmount;
- if (claimable < _amount || _amount == 0) revert InvalidClaimAmount();
// Only load the specific tokenIds needed for the claim
unchecked {
+ uint256 claimable = releasedAmount - claimedAmount;
+ if (claimable < _amount || _amount == 0) revert InvalidClaimAmount();
uint256[] memory tokenIds = PatronVestingStorage._getVestingEntryRange(
_recipient,
_tierId,
claimedAmount, // start from claimed amount
claimedAmount + _amount // up to claimed + amount
);
IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
emit TokensClaimed(_recipient, _destination, _amount, _tierId);
PatronVestingStorage._updateClaimedAmount(_recipient, _tierId, _amount);
if (_amount == 1) {
patronNft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), _destination, tokenIds[0]);
} else {
patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(address(this), _destination, tokenIds);
}
}
Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L474-L503
Optimization of _removeLastNVestingEntries()
function:
function _removeLastNVestingEntries(address _recipient, uint8 _tierId, uint256 _amount)
internal
returns (uint256[] memory tokenIds)
{
IPatronVesting.VestingEntry storage entry = getStorage().vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId];
tokenIds = new uint256[](_amount);
+ unchecked {
uint256 startIndex = entry.totalAllocation - _amount;
- unchecked {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _amount;) {
uint256 currentIndex = startIndex + i;
tokenIds[i] = entry.tokenIds[currentIndex];
delete entry.tokenIds[currentIndex];
++i;
}
}
- entry.totalAllocation -= _amount;
+ entry.totalAllocation = startIndex;
return tokenIds;
}
Reference: PatronVestingStorage.sol#L233-L255
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The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Infinex team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.