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Infinex A-15

Security Audit

December 20, 2024

Version 1.0.0

Presented by 0xMacro

Table of Contents

Introduction

This document includes the results of the security audit for Infinex's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team on November 4th, November 29th, 2024, and from December 17th to 19th, 2024.

The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Infinex Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.

Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.

Overall Assessment

The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:

Severity Count Acknowledged Won't Do Addressed
Low 1 - 1 -
Code Quality 1 - - 1
Gas Optimization 1 - - 1

Infinex was quick to respond to these issues.

Specification

Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:

Source Code

The following source code was reviewed during the audit:


Specifically, we audited the following contracts for Patron Vesting V2 within commit 186a5898d243ac7558f3f2524890daca0ebd39b3:

Source Code SHA256
src/patron/IPatronVesting.sol

c7d5e53be1a9363d8a823d748b9dc1761752bfbd5db16a6b043f9d17376be528

src/patron/PatronVesting.sol

d9750e97a07bc297cc10e6cd565cc3546457be66c05973dae43c0a7852c2f6a3

src/patron/PatronVestingStorage.sol

3d032e120d34ed57266188d3465313363da64064c5b55dd326728a8fa087a977

Issue Descriptions and Recommendations

Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.

Security Level Reference

We quantify issues in three parts:

  1. The high/medium/low/spec-breaking impact of the issue:
    • How bad things can get (for a vulnerability)
    • The significance of an improvement (for a code quality issue)
    • The amount of gas saved (for a gas optimization)
  2. The high/medium/low likelihood of the issue:
    • How likely is the issue to occur (for a vulnerability)
  3. The overall critical/high/medium/low severity of the issue.

This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:

Severity Description
(C-x)
Critical

We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost.

(H-x)
High

We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec.

(M-x)
Medium

We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner.

(L-x)
Low

The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way.

Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project.

(Q-x)
Code Quality

The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design.

(I-x)
Informational

Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required.

(G-x)
Gas Optimizations

The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it.

Issue Details

L-1

tierOwnerAddVestingEntry() fails when using trusted forwarder

Topic
DoS
Status
Wont Do
Impact
Medium
Likelihood
Low

When calling the PatronNFT.tierOwnerAddVestingEntry() function, the tier owner can either call the function directly or via the trusted forwarder:

modifier onlyTierOwner(uint8 _tierId) {
    if (_ERC2771MsgSender() != PatronVestingStorage._tierConfig(_tierId).tierOwner) {
        revert UnauthorizedCaller();
    }
    _;
}

Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L81-L86

When using the trusted forwarder, the patron NFTs are pulled from msg.sender, which will be the forwarder address instead of the tier owner as expected. As a result, the function reverts:

function tierOwnerAddVestingEntry(address _recipient, uint256[] calldata _indices, uint8 _tierId)
    external
    onlyTierOwner(_tierId)
{
    emit VestingEntryAdded(_recipient, _tierId);
    IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
>>  patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _indices);
    PatronVestingStorage._addVestingEntry(_recipient, _tierId, _indices);
}

Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L251-L259

Remediations to Consider:

Consider replacing msg.sender with _ERC2771MsgSender() :

function tierOwnerAddVestingEntry(address _recipient, uint256[] calldata _indices, uint8 _tierId)
    external
    onlyTierOwner(_tierId)
{
    emit VestingEntryAdded(_recipient, _tierId);
    IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
-   patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _indices);
+   patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(_ERC2771MsgSender(), address(this), _indices);
    PatronVestingStorage._addVestingEntry(_recipient, _tierId, _indices);
}
Response by Infinex

We are highly unlikely to use with the forwarder as all the tier owners are safe's / EOA's and we are likely to submit transactions via script or the cannon website

Q-1

Add address(0) check for _newRecipient

Topic
Validation
Status
Quality Impact
Medium

In allocateCWGTokens, there is no check that prevents passing address(0) for the _newRecipient parameter. This is in contrast to PatronDistributor’s registerRecipient function, which explicitly doesn’t allow providing address(0) for the _recipient parameter.

Remediation to Consider

Revert if address(0) is passed for the _newRecipient parameter.

G-1

Small gas optimizations

Topic
Gas optimizations
Status
Gas Savings
Low
  1. The _end and _start validation checks in _getVestingEntryRange() can never occur when being called from _claim(). They can be abstracted to the getVestingEntryRange() view function.

    function _getVestingEntryRange(address _recipient, uint8 _tierId, uint256 _start, uint256 _end)
        internal
        view
        returns (uint256[] memory tokenIds)
    {
        Data storage store = getStorage();
    -   if (_end <= _start || _end > store.vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId].totalAllocation) {
        -       revert IPatronVesting.InvalidRange();
        -   }
            uint256 length = _end - _start;
            tokenIds = new uint256[](length);
    
            // Only loads the specific array elements needed
            unchecked {
                for (uint256 i = 0; i < length;) {
                    tokenIds[i] = store.vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId].tokenIds[_start + i];
                    ++i;
                }
            }
        }
    

    Reference: PatronVestingStorage.sol#L116-L132

  2. claimable calculation can also be included in the unchecked block as the releasedAmount will always be higher or equal to the claimedAmount.

    - 		uint256 claimable = releasedAmount - claimedAmount;
    - 		if (claimable < _amount || _amount == 0) revert InvalidClaimAmount();
        
                // Only load the specific tokenIds needed for the claim
                unchecked {
    + 		        uint256 claimable = releasedAmount - claimedAmount;
    + 		        if (claimable < _amount || _amount == 0) revert InvalidClaimAmount();			
            
                    uint256[] memory tokenIds = PatronVestingStorage._getVestingEntryRange(
                        _recipient,
                        _tierId,
                        claimedAmount, // start from claimed amount
                        claimedAmount + _amount // up to claimed + amount
                    );
                    IERC721ABatchTransferable patronNft = IERC721ABatchTransferable(PatronVestingStorage._patronNFT());
                    emit TokensClaimed(_recipient, _destination, _amount, _tierId);
                    PatronVestingStorage._updateClaimedAmount(_recipient, _tierId, _amount);
            
                    if (_amount == 1) {
                        patronNft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), _destination, tokenIds[0]);
                    } else {
                        patronNft.safeBatchTransferFrom(address(this), _destination, tokenIds);
                    }
                }
    

    Reference: PatronVesting.sol#L474-L503

  3. Optimization of _removeLastNVestingEntries() function:

        function _removeLastNVestingEntries(address _recipient, uint8 _tierId, uint256 _amount)
            internal
            returns (uint256[] memory tokenIds)
        {
            IPatronVesting.VestingEntry storage entry = getStorage().vestingEntries[_recipient][_tierId];
            tokenIds = new uint256[](_amount);
    
    +       unchecked {
            uint256 startIndex = entry.totalAllocation - _amount;
    
    -       unchecked {
                for (uint256 i = 0; i < _amount;) {
                    uint256 currentIndex = startIndex + i;
                    tokenIds[i] = entry.tokenIds[currentIndex];
                    delete entry.tokenIds[currentIndex];
                    ++i;
                }
            }
    -       entry.totalAllocation -= _amount;
    +       entry.totalAllocation = startIndex;
            return tokenIds;
        }
    

    Reference: PatronVestingStorage.sol#L233-L255

Disclaimer

Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Infinex team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.