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Seven Seas A-10

Security Audit

July 10, 2024

Version 1.0.0

Presented by 0xMacro

Table of Contents

Introduction

This document includes the results of the security audit for Seven Seas's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team on periodically from june 20th to july 8th 2024.

The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Seven Seas Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.

Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.

Overall Assessment

The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:

Severity Count Acknowledged Won't Do Addressed
Low 2 - - 2

Seven Seas was quick to respond to these issues.

Specification

Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:

Trust Assumptions:

Part of this audit investigated authorizing trusted protocols to call bulk deposit on the teller. Doing so allows the protocol to skip over the set share lock period that normal depositors experience. It is trusted that the protocols authorized to make bulk deposits cannot or are trusted to not maliciously use the lack of a share lock period, to arbitrage share price updates.

Source Code

The following source code was reviewed during the audit:

Specifically, we audited the following contracts within this repository.

Source Code SHA256
src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/BridgingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

bd6d9dfa44f3eb1892b0fd1865556918d77b5660d18fc729c37b79e859f2a531

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/EtherFiLiquidEthDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

1d4d53ddb56cbba71cd64f581910237977bb87968eaba625fa8a1ac19e8816c0

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/PancakeSwapV3FullDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

2f44f23d7c1a01701e4446d0e7eb83510d079a4ed3dce055b83108caea3dd053

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/CCIPDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

df112acbbe4c3bc48645abdc008eaf0468e45575cab336453939a6079208f4ca

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/ITB/ITBPositionDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

338232d68727bbc8c8f790995a97de8b6bc139a08b57e32614f8562d42a8e3c2

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/ITB/karak/KarakDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

ded26ce6189c2acdbbe93c7dd0b8e59027ee0e5e5ebbb3c332bc6e9f4b27cf88

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/PancakeSwapV3DecoderAndSanitizer.sol

c8bd2c24f98cbfef98ca7fa15396054e9ffb4217bc9ca5f09c6f6b2a688183a1

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/PendleRouterDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

c2e1bec097d8ba7038371eb239125f28277ca310890dad8b1cfe6768c0f26606

src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/ArbitrumNativeBridgeDecoderAndSanitizer.sol

29c261d40412922b7a9288c89533a08cfde065c3cb153ccdb68cc6efdd7643fc

src/base/Roles/CrossChain/CrossChainTellerWithGenericBridge.sol

cd398597495709603bd365194aacf8351433a00d6ece76ea15e89099077a860f

src/base/Roles/TellerWithMultiAssetSupport.sol

07884e603f6c8ac9148cd3bcdda9d9bf1cd94b089d8b272b452494c7143e8894

src/interfaces/DecoderCustomTypes.sol

731408dc5444a13052f61d2fd5501feb2dce900b30f9fd27deb86575d88cc6f5

Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.

Issue Descriptions and Recommendations

Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.

Security Level Reference

We quantify issues in three parts:

  1. The high/medium/low/spec-breaking impact of the issue:
    • How bad things can get (for a vulnerability)
    • The significance of an improvement (for a code quality issue)
    • The amount of gas saved (for a gas optimization)
  2. The high/medium/low likelihood of the issue:
    • How likely is the issue to occur (for a vulnerability)
  3. The overall critical/high/medium/low severity of the issue.

This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:

Severity Description
(C-x)
Critical

We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost.

(H-x)
High

We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec.

(M-x)
Medium

We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner.

(L-x)
Low

The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way.

Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project.

(Q-x)
Code Quality

The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design.

(I-x)
Informational

Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required.

(G-x)
Gas Optimizations

The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it.

Issue Details

L-1

Bulk deposits and withdrawals are not pauseable

Topic
protocol design
Status
Impact
Low
Likelihood
Low

In TellerWithMultiAssetSupport.sol, the deposit() and depositWithPermit() functions are prevented if the teller is paused, however the bulkDeposit() and bulkWithdraw() functions are not restricted when the teller is paused. The initial intent was that these bulk functions would only be called by trusted entities, like solvers, so it made sense to allow for these functions to execute even when paused. In the case of bulkDeposit(), it skips over setting a share lock for the address receiving the shares, which is a desired outcome for some trusted protocols that want to integrate with these vaults. If authorization to call bulkDeposit() is given to these protocols, it makes sense for these functions to be paused as well, since interaction is no longer solely operated by limited entities, and pausing these functions may be required.

Remediations to Consider

Add checks if the teller is paused for both bulkDeposit() and bulkWithdraw().

L-2

CCIP events benefit from being indexed

Topic
Events
Status
Impact
Low
Likelihood
Medium

In CrossChainTellerWithGenericBridge.sol the events MessageSent and MessageReceived are emitted when sending or receiving a message:

 event MessageSent(bytes32 messageId, uint256 shareAmount, address to);
 event MessageReceived(bytes32 messageId, uint256 shareAmount, address to);

Reference: CrossChainTellerWithGenericBridge.sol#L13-L14

The messageId and to address are not indexed, which may make it more difficult for off chain application to get relevant bridging information for a user or messageId.

Remediations to Consider

Add indexed to the messageId and to event params.

Disclaimer

Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Seven Seas team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.