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Security Audit
Oct 16, 2024
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Seven Seas's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from Oct 13th to Oct 14th 2024.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Seven Seas Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
| Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 1 | - | - | 1 |
Seven Seas was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
ec74b24330a1d7b144dc397c1c20c76e3d6fc460
Specifically, we audited the changes for the following contracts in PR 139 as well as a review of the safety of integrating with usual money contracts.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/UsualMoneyDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/EtherFiLiquidUsdDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Additionally, the SatLayer protocol was reviewed and its associated decoder from PR 135 was audited.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/SatlayerStakingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/PointFarmingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Additionally, the Bitcorn protocol was reviewed and its associated staking decoder from PR 134 was audited.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/CornStakingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/PointFarmingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Additionally, the Frax staking was reviewed and its associated staking decoder from PR 127 was audited.
Additionally, the BoringVault Withdrawal Queue and Solver from PR 130 was audited.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/Roles/BoringQueue/BoringOnChainQueue.sol |
|
| src/base/Roles/BoringQueue/BoringOnChainQueueWithTracking.sol |
|
| src/base/Roles/BoringQueue/BoringSolver.sol |
|
| src/base/Roles/BoringQueue/IBoringSolver.sol |
|
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/FraxDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/StakingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Additionally, Lido wstETH bridging was reviewed and its associated bridging decoder from PR 126 was audited.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/LidoStandardBridgeDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/BridgingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Additionally, we reviewed the use of Elixir withdrawals using the Ethena decoder defined in PR 133 as well as a review of the safety of integrating with usual money contracts.
Eigen Layer delegation and claiming functionality was added and reviewed.
| Source Code | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/base/DecodersAndSanitizers/Protocols/EigenLayerLSTStakingDecoderAndSanitizer.sol |
|
Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
|
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
|
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
|
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
|
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
|
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
|
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
BoringOnChainQueue.sol allows users to request to withdraw BoringVault shares for accepted withdrawal assets, although there is a waiting period before the request can be fulfilled. Requests are intended to be fulfilled by users or solvers via the solveOnChainWithdraws() function.
The BoringSolver.sol contract can fulfill more complex solves and has permission to make bulkWithdrawal() and bulkDeposit() calls on Boring Vaults which allows them to fulfill withdrawals for users in the withdrawal queue.
The execution path for the BoringSolver is to call an initial external function it initiate the required solve type, like boringRedeemMintSolve(), which then calls solveOnChainWithdrawals on the queue with the required solveData, with the BoringOnChainQueue calling back boringSolve() to complete the solve using the initially passed in solveData.
However, boringSolve() is an external function that has no explicit permission guard, and assumes the caller is the queue:
function boringSolve(
address initiator,
address boringVault,
address solveAsset,
uint256 totalShares,
uint256 requiredAssets,
bytes calldata solveData
) external requiresAuth {
if (initiator != address(this)) revert BoringSolver___WrongInitiator();
address queue = msg.sender;
SolveType solveType = abi.decode(solveData, (SolveType));
if (solveType == SolveType.BORING_REDEEM) {
_boringRedeemSolve(queue, solveData, boringVault, solveAsset, totalShares, requiredAssets);
} else if (solveType == SolveType.BORING_REDEEM_MINT) {
_boringRedeemMintSolve(queue, solveData, boringVault, solveAsset, totalShares, requiredAssets);
} else {
// Added for future protection, if another enum is added, txs with that enum will revert,
// if no changes are made here.
revert BoringSolver___FailedToSolve();
}
}
Reference: BoringSolver.sol#L121-L147
Any contract/eoa can pass the initiator as the BoringSolver contract address, send into the contract the desired boringVault shares and make use of it permission to withdraw via either solve type and get around the withdrawal delay.
Users could leverage this and frontrun/backrun share price updates to immediately benefit without being required to hold onto shares long term.
Remediations to Consider
Require the caller of boringSolve() to be a trusted withdrawal queue to prevent any user from taking advantage of BoringSolver permissions.
Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Seven Seas team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.