thirdweb A-13

Security Audit

June 30th, 2023

Version 1.0.0

Presented by 0xMacro

Table of Contents


This document includes the results of the security audit for thirdweb's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from June 13, 2023 to June 23, 2023.

The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain thirdweb Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.

Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.

Overall Assessment

The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:

Severity Count Acknowledged Won't Do Addressed
High 1 - - 1
Medium 1 - - 1
Code Quality 4 - - 4
Informational 2 - - 2

thirdweb was quick to respond to these issues.


Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:

Source Code

The following source code was reviewed during the audit:

We audited the following contracts specificially for the Dynamic Drops audit:

Contract SHA256


















We audited the following contracts specificially for the Loyalty Card audit:

Contract SHA256


Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.

Issue Descriptions and Recommendations

Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.

Security Level Reference

We quantify issues in three parts:

  1. The high/medium/low/spec-breaking impact of the issue:
    • How bad things can get (for a vulnerability)
    • The significance of an improvement (for a code quality issue)
    • The amount of gas saved (for a gas optimization)
  2. The high/medium/low likelihood of the issue:
    • How likely is the issue to occur (for a vulnerability)
  3. The overall critical/high/medium/low severity of the issue.

This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:

Severity Description

We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost.


We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec.


We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner.


The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way.

Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project.

Code Quality

The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design.


Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required.

Gas Optimizations

The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it.

Issue Details


Mint price is determined by quantity

Incentive Design

LoyaltyCard.mintWithSignature always only mints 1 NFT to the user as stated in the comments:

/// @dev Mints an NFT according to the provided mint request. Always mints 1 NFT.

and defined by the line LoyaltyCard#L276:

_safeMint(_to, 1);

However, in _collectPrice, the total price the user has to pay is calculated as follows:

uint256 totalPrice = _quantityToClaim * _pricePerToken;

Thus, for quantity > 1, the user has to pay the total price determined by the quantity, despite only getting 1 NFT minted.

Remediations to Consider

Consider only allowing mint request with quantity = 1 and otherwise revert.


Native token can get locked in drop contracts

Use Cases

Reference: DropERC20Logic.sol#L124, DropERC721Logic.sol#L199, DropERC1155Logic.sol#L206


DropERC20Logic inherits from Drop contract which implements the payable claim(…) function that calls _collectPriceOnClaim to transfer payment to feeRecipient and saleRecipient.

The issue of locking native tokens in the contract occurs under the following circumstances:

  1. Payment currency in claimConditions is set to ERC20.
  2. A user calls claim with appropriate amount of ERC20 tokens approved and accidentally also passes native tokens along.

As a result, the claim call succeeds but the native tokens passed along will be locked within the DropERC20 contract.

Note that this issue also applies to DropERC721Logic and DropERC1155Logic.

An admin could rescue the tokens by adding a new extension that provides appropriate function to transfer tokens back to original owners. However, it is recommended to avoid such situations in the first place.

Remediations to Consider

Consider checking that no native tokens are transferred (msg.value == 0) when payment currency is set to ERC20.


ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable not initialized

Best Practice
Quality Impact

LoyaltyCard inherits from ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable but is not being initialized in the initialize function.

Note that due to the logic in ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable, this doesn’t impose any security risk, but it is considered as best practice to properly initialize all parent contracts.

Remediations to Consider

Consider initializing ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable properly by adding __ReentrancyGuard_init to the initialize function.



Clean Code
Quality Impact

OPERATOR_ROLE is declared in the following contracts:

However, this role is not used anywhere else in the code

Remediations to Consider

Consider removing OPERATOR_ROLE declarations from above contracts.


Unused Import

Clean Code
Quality Impact

The following imports of ReentrancyGuardInit are not required and can be removed:

The following import of ERC20VotesStorage is not required and can be removed:


Storage gap variable not needed

Clean Code
Quality Impact

Due to the use of dynamic contract pattern and its use of unstructured storage, __gap variables declared in some of the upgradable contracts are not needed. Consider removing the __gap variable from the following files:


Transfers are enabled by default

Use Case

LoyaltyCard allows the transfers of NFTs by default; enabled by the following line in initialize:

_setupRole(TRANSFER_ROLE, address(0));

Due to the use case of LoyaltyCard - namely issuing NFTs to loyal customers - consider restricting transfers by default for normal users and only allow transfers for admins having the TRANSFER_ROLE assigned.


No support for flat platform fee

Use Case

OpenEditionERC721 has been recently updated to support a new fee mechanism called “flat fee” besides “percentage fee”. However, all three drop contracts only support “percentage fee”. Consider updating drop contracts to support “flat fee” in addition to “percentage fee”.


Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the thirdweb team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.