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Security Audit
July 15th, 2024
Version 1.0.0
Presented by 0xMacro
This document includes the results of the security audit for Treasure DAO's smart contract code as found in the section titled ‘Source Code’. The security audit was performed by the Macro security team from June 20, 2024 to July 2, 2024.
The purpose of this audit is to review the source code of certain Treasure DAO Solidity contracts, and provide feedback on the design, architecture, and quality of the source code with an emphasis on validating the correctness and security of the software in its entirety.
Disclaimer: While Macro’s review is comprehensive and has surfaced some changes that should be made to the source code, this audit should not solely be relied upon for security, as no single audit is guaranteed to catch all possible bugs.
The following is an aggregation of issues found by the Macro Audit team:
| Severity | Count | Acknowledged | Won't Do | Addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| Code Quality | 3 | 3 | - | - |
| Informational | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| Gas Optimization | 2 | 2 | - | - |
Treasure DAO was quick to respond to these issues.
Our understanding of the specification was based on the following sources:
The following source code was reviewed during the audit:
58ab5a8ac2c4cf60239b389c6c2ad3be71984afc
58ab5a8ac2c4cf60239b389c6c2ad3be71984afc
Specifically, we audited the following contract within this repository:
| Contract | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| src/Rewards/StakingContractMainnet.sol |
|
| src/Rewards/libraries/FullMath.sol |
|
| src/Rewards/libraries/PackedUint144.sol |
|
| src/Router/IMagicSwapV2Router.sol |
|
| src/Router/MagicSwapV2Router.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/UniswapV2ERC20.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/UniswapV2Factory.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/UniswapV2Pair.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/interfaces/IUniswapV2Callee.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/interfaces/IUniswapV2ERC20.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/libraries/Oracle.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/libraries/SafeMath.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/libraries/UQ112x112.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/core/libraries/UniswapV2Math.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/libraries/Babylonian.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/libraries/BitMath.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/libraries/FullMath.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/libraries/TransferHelper.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/UniswapV2Router02.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/interfaces/IERC20.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/interfaces/IWETH.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/libraries/OracleLibrary.sol |
|
| src/UniswapV2/periphery/libraries/UniswapV2Library.sol |
|
| src/Vault/INftVault.sol |
|
| src/Vault/INftVaultFactory.sol |
|
| src/Vault/NftVault.sol |
|
| src/Vault/NftVaultFactory.sol |
|
Note: This document contains an audit solely of the Solidity contracts listed above. Specifically, the audit pertains only to the contracts themselves, and does not pertain to any other programs or scripts, including deployment scripts.
Click on an issue to jump to it, or scroll down to see them all.
We quantify issues in three parts:
This third part – the severity level – is a summary of how much consideration the client should give to fixing the issue. We assign severity according to the table of guidelines below:
| Severity | Description |
|---|---|
|
(C-x) Critical |
We recommend the client must fix the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would mean significant funds/assets WILL be lost. |
|
(H-x) High |
We recommend the client must address the issue, no matter what, because not fixing would be very bad, or some funds/assets will be lost, or the code’s behavior is against the provided spec. |
|
(M-x) Medium |
We recommend the client to seriously consider fixing the issue, as the implications of not fixing the issue are severe enough to impact the project significantly, albiet not in an existential manner. |
|
(L-x) Low |
The risk is small, unlikely, or may not relevant to the project in a meaningful way. Whether or not the project wants to develop a fix is up to the goals and needs of the project. |
|
(Q-x) Code Quality |
The issue identified does not pose any obvious risk, but fixing could improve overall code quality, on-chain composability, developer ergonomics, or even certain aspects of protocol design. |
|
(I-x) Informational |
Warnings and things to keep in mind when operating the protocol. No immediate action required. |
|
(G-x) Gas Optimizations |
The presented optimization suggestion would save an amount of gas significant enough, in our opinion, to be worth the development cost of implementing it. |
In the StakingContractMainnet:updateIncentive() function, the IncentiveUpdated() event is emitted at the end of the execution in the following way.
emit IncentiveUpdated(incentiveId, changeAmount, incentive.lastRewardTime, incentive.endTime);
However, the changeAmount argument does not, in all cases, represent the actual amount with which the incentive was updated. In the scenario where the change amount is less than 0, and its absolute value is greater than the remaining reward, the actual change amount would equal the value of rewardRemaining.
} else if (changeAmount < 0) {
uint112 transferOut = uint112(-changeAmount);
>> if (transferOut > incentive.rewardRemaining) transferOut = incentive.rewardRemaining;
unchecked { incentive.rewardRemaining -= transferOut; }
ERC20(incentive.rewardToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender, transferOut);
}
Remediations to consider
IncentiveUpdated() event emission to send the proper changeAmount value in all scenarios so that off-chain monitoring and tracking tools have the correct input data. Consider replacing following check across the contract with call to new function _validIncentiveId().
if (incentiveId > incentiveCount || incentiveId <= 0) revert InvalidInput();
New function
function _validIncentiveId(uint256 incentiveId) internal returns(bool) {
return incentiveId != 0 && incentiveId <= incentiveCount;
}
Update current checks with the following:
if(!_validIncentiveId(incentiveId)) revert InvalidInput();
Instances:
createIncentive() - reward amount cannot be less than 0 since it is uint112.
if (rewardAmount <= 0) revert InvalidInput();
subscribeToIncentive(), accrueRewards(), claimRewards() - incentiveId cannot be less than 0 since it is uint256.
if (incentiveId > incentiveCount || incentiveId <= 0) revert InvalidInput();
subscribeToIncentive() - referenced value cannot be less than 0 since it is uint112.
if (userStakes[msg.sender][incentive.token].liquidity <= 0) revert NotStaked();
In updateIncentive() - when changeAmount, newStartTime, and newEndTime are all zeros, IncentiveUpdate event will be emitted even though no changes have been performed.
Also, in stake() and unstake() when amount is 0, Stake() and Unstake() events may be emitted, without corresponding state updates.
Since events without state update may negatively impact off-chain tracking tools, consider updating implementation to not emit event unless at least one of the parameters has changed.
In updateIncentive() - changeAmount is casted multiple times.
incentive.rewardRemaining += uint112(changeAmount);
ERC20(incentive.rewardToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), uint112(changeAmount));
Consider assigning casted value to variable in memory and using it instead.
In the StakingContractMainnet, replace _increment(i) calls with unchecked { ++i; } at the end of each loop for more efficient operation, or update contract to use Solidity version 0.8.22+ which has this optimization built in by default.
Current StakingContractMainnet implementation, does not support fee-on-transfer tokens nor rebase tokens, as staking and reward tokens. Parties interacting with the contract are advised not to configure it with such tokens nor use incentives relying on such tokens.
Macro makes no warranties, either express, implied, statutory, or otherwise, with respect to the services or deliverables provided in this report, and Macro specifically disclaims all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, noninfringement and those arising from a course of dealing, usage or trade with respect thereto, and all such warranties are hereby excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.
Macro will not be liable for any lost profits, business, contracts, revenue, goodwill, production, anticipated savings, loss of data, or costs of procurement of substitute goods or services or for any claim or demand by any other party. In no event will Macro be liable for consequential, incidental, special, indirect, or exemplary damages arising out of this agreement or any work statement, however caused and (to the fullest extent permitted by law) under any theory of liability (including negligence), even if Macro has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
The scope of this report and review is limited to a review of only the code presented by the Treasure DAO team and only the source code Macro notes as being within the scope of Macro’s review within this report. This report does not include an audit of the deployment scripts used to deploy the Solidity contracts in the repository corresponding to this audit. Specifically, for the avoidance of doubt, this report does not constitute investment advice, is not intended to be relied upon as investment advice, is not an endorsement of this project or team, and it is not a guarantee as to the absolute security of the project. In this report you may through hypertext or other computer links, gain access to websites operated by persons other than Macro. Such hyperlinks are provided for your reference and convenience only, and are the exclusive responsibility of such websites’ owners. You agree that Macro is not responsible for the content or operation of such websites, and that Macro shall have no liability to your or any other person or entity for the use of third party websites. Macro assumes no responsibility for the use of third party software and shall have no liability whatsoever to any person or entity for the accuracy or completeness of any outcome generated by such software.